May 2008
Beijing Embraces Classical Fascism
北京拥抱正统法西斯主义
by Michael Ledeen

In 2002, I speculated that China may be something we have never seen before: a mature fascist state. Recent events there, especially the mass rage in response to Western criticism, seem to confirm that theory. More significantly, over the intervening six years China’s leaders have consolidated their hold on the organs of control—political, economic and cultural. Instead of gradually embracing pluralism as many expected, China’s corporatist elite has become even more entrenched.
在2002年，我就推测中国可能会成为一个我们从未见过的中国：一个成熟的法西斯国家。最近在那里发生的事件，特别是群众对西方批评的愤怒，似乎证明了我这一理论。更重要的是，间隔六年后，中国政府的领导已经已巩固了对政治，经济和文化等控制机关的掌控。与很多人所期待的正相反，中国不是逐步地括大其多元性，其企业精英分子反而变得更加根深蒂固。

though they still call themselves communists, and the Communist Party rules the country, classical fascism should be the starting point for our efforts to understand the People’s Republic. Imagine Italy 50 years after the fascist revolution. Mussolini would be dead and buried, the corporate state would be largely intact, the party would be firmly in control, and Italy would be governed by professional politicians, part of a corrupt elite, rather than the true believers who had marched on Rome. It would no longer be a system based on charisma, but would instead rest almost entirely on political repression, the leaders would be businesslike and cynical, not idealistic, and they would constantly invoke formulaic appeals to the grandeur of the “great Italian people,” “endlessly summoned to emulate the greatness of its ancestors.”
即使他们仍称自己是共产党人，而且共产党仍然是执政党，但是我们仍然可以把经典法西斯主义作为我们试图了解这个人民共和国的出发点。想一下法西斯革命后意大利的五十年。墨索里尼死了并被被埋葬，（他所倡导的）社团主义毫发无伤，党牢牢地掌控全局，意大利被专业政客－腐败的精英分子中的一部分――统治，而不是那些在罗马游行的真正信徒。这不再是一个以非凡领导力为基础的系统制度，而是几乎全部依靠施加政治压力来统治国家，国家领导人更像是在公事公办、愤世嫉俗，没有任何理想主义的影子。他们不断地向了不起的“伟大的意大利人民”发起公式化的呼吁，“无休止地召唤他们去重塑其祖先的辉煌。”

Substitute in the “great Chinese people” and it all sounds familiar. We are certainly not dealing with a Communist regime, either politically or economically, nor do Chinese leaders, even those who followed the radical reformer Deng Xiaoping, seem to be at all interested in treading the dangerous and uneven path from Stalinism to democracy. They know that Mikhail Gorbachev fell when he tried to control the economy while giving political freedom. They are attempting the opposite, keeping a firm grip on political power while permitting relatively free areas of economic enterprise. Their political methods are quite like those used by the European fascists 80 years ago.
如果用“伟大的中国人民”去取代上文中的“伟大的意大利人民”，上面这句话也同样成立。无论在政治上还是经济上，我们所面对的绝对不是一个共产政权。而且中国的领导人，即使是那些激进改革家邓小平的追随者，看起来也丝毫没有兴趣用民主去取代那条危险而坎坷的斯大林主义之路。他们知道戈尔巴乔夫的下台是因为他试图在掌控经济的同时开放政治自由。所以现在中国政府正在反其道而行之，即姥姥掌握政权的同时，在某些经济领域上释放相对的自由。他们所使用的政治手段与80年前欧洲的法西斯如出一辙。

Unlike traditional communist dictators—Mao, for example—who extirpated traditional culture and replaced it with a sterile Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese now enthusiastically, even compulsively, embrace the glories of China’s long history. Their passionate reassertion of the greatness of past dynasties has both entranced and baffled Western observers, because it does not fit the model of an “evolving communist system.”
现在的中国人正狂热地、自觉地拥抱为中国悠久而辉煌的历史。他们不同于传统的共产独裁者，比如毛泽东，那些独裁者的做法是根除传统文化并想用不成熟的马克思列宁主义来取而代之。他们狂热地重审历史朝代的伟大，这既让西方人民着迷，也让西方人民迷惑不已，因为这与“不断进化进步的共产主义制度”模式不相相符。

Yet the fascist leaders of the 1920s and 1930s used exactly the same device. Mussolini rebuilt Rome to provide a dramatic visual reminder of ancient glories, and he used ancient history to justify the conquest of Libya and Ethiopia. Hitler’s favorite architect built neoclassical buildings throughout the Third Reich, and his favorite operatic composer organized festivals to celebrate the country’s mythic past.
然后，在19世纪20和30年代，法西斯领导者就用了完全一样的手段。墨索里尼通过重建罗马来为人们提供一个生动的古代辉煌的回顾。而且他用古代史去证明征服利比亚和埃塞俄比亚是合理的。在整个第三帝国，希特勒最喜欢的建筑师兴建新古典主义楼宇，他最喜欢的歌剧作曲家举办艺术节来庆祝这个国家神话般的过去。

Like their European predecessors, the Chinese claim a major role in the world because of their history and culture, not just on the basis of their current power, or scientific or cultural accomplishments. China even toys with some of the more bizarre notions of the earlier fascisms, such as the program to make the country self-sufficient in wheat production—the same quest for autarky that obsessed both Hitler and Mussolini.
像他们欧洲的前辈一样，中国人以其历史和文化，而不是以目前他们的力量以及在科学文化上的成就来说明自己在世界的重要地位。中国甚至玩起那些早期法西斯主义的更古怪的伎俩，比如使国家的小麦产量自己自足的项目，这些伎俩也曾同样让希特勒和墨索里尼痴迷。

To be sure, the world is much changed since the first half of the last century. It’s much harder (and sometimes impossible) to go it alone. Passions for total independence from the outside world are tempered by the realities of today’s global economy, and China’s appetite for oil and other raw materials is properly legendary. But the Chinese, like the European fascists, are intensely xenophobic, and obviously worry that their people may turn against them if they learn too much about the rest of the world. They consequently work very hard to dominate the flow of information. Just ask Google, forced to cooperate with the censors in order to work in China.
能肯定的是，现在的世界比上世纪的上半叶有了很大的改变。孤军奋斗是很困难的（或者是不可能的）。与外界彻底独立出来的热情被现代的全球化经济这一现实所制约，而且中国对石油和原材料的欲望在一定程度是享有盛名的。但中国人，像欧洲的法西斯者一样，他们有着激烈的恐外心理，而且明显地担心着他们的人民对外面世界知道太多后，会背叛他们。因而他们为主宰媒体信息做了很多工作。不信，问问谷歌。他们为了在中国的生存屈从于与中国的审查制度。

Some scholars of contemporary China see the Beijing regime as very nervous, and perhaps even unstable, and they are encouraged in this belief when they see recent events such as the eruption of popular sentiment against the Tibetan monks’ modest protests. That view is further reinforced by similar outcries against most any criticism of Chinese performance, from human rights to air pollution, and from preparations for the Olympic Games to the failure of Chinese quality control in food production and children’s toys. The recent treatment of French retailer Carrefour at the hands of Chinese nationalists is a case in point. It has been publicly excoriated and shunned because France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy dared to consider the possibility of boycotting the Olympics.
一些中国当代学者认为北京的政权制度非常地紧张，甚至不稳定。而且他们从最近的事件中，如西藏僧人的温和抗议所引发的普遍反对情绪，似乎看到了对自己观点的验证。于此相类似的中国人对几乎任何外界批评所表现出的抗议似乎又进一步验证了他们的观点 --从人权问题到环境问题，从奥林匹克的准备工作到在食物和儿童玩具质控的失败。中国的民族主义这最近对法国零售商家加乐福的抵制就是一个恰当的例子。加乐福被公开地痛斥和排斥，这因为法国的总统尼古拉•萨尔科齐有胆量考虑抵制奥林匹克的可能。

In all these cases, it is tempting to conclude that the regime is worried about its own survival, and, in order to rally nationalist passions, feels compelled to portray the country as a global victim. Perhaps they are right. The strongest evidence to support the theory of insecurity at the highest levels of Chinese society is the practice of the “princelings” (wealthy children of the ruling elites) to buy homes in places such as the United States, Canada and Australia. These are not luxury homes of the sort favored by wealthy businessman and officials from the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. Rather they are typically “normal” homes of the sort a potential émigré might want to have in reserve in case things went bad back home.
上面所有的例子，都引诱我们得出这样一个结论：这个政权在担心他们自己的生存问题，并且为了重整民族主义热情，他们必须得把自己塑造成一个全球性受害者。这也许是对的。支持对中国最上层社会的无安全感这一理论最有力的证据是“太子党”（执政党精英的有钱子女）的事实，他们在美国，加拿大，澳大利亚等地购买房子。这些房子并不是中东富有的石油国的那些有钱商人和官员喜欢的那种豪华房子。更准确点，他们只是典型的“普通”房子，是作为一旦国内形势不利时的避难所。

Moreover, there are reasons to believe that eruptions of nationalist passion do indeed worry the regime, and Chinese leaders have certainly tamped down such episodes in the past. In recent days, the regime has even reached out to the Dalai Lama himself in an apparent effort to calm the situation, after previously enouncing the “Dalai clique” as a dangerous form of separatism and even treason.
此外，我们有理由相信 当局对民族主义激情的爆发确实是有担心的，而且中国领导者在过去也曾多次摆平过这类事件。在最近几天，在早前宣布dl喇嘛是危险的分裂主义分子甚至是叛国者后，中国政府甚至主动也dl喇嘛接触，这明显就是想平静下来局势。

On the other hand, the cult of victimhood was always part of fascist culture. Just like Germany and Italy in the interwar period, China feels betrayed and humiliated, and seeks to avenge her many historic wounds. This is not necessarily a true sign of anxiety; it’s an integral part of the sort of hypernationalism that has always been at the heart of all fascist movements and regimes. We cannot look into the souls of the Chinese tyrants, but I doubt that China is an intensely unstable system, riven by the democratic impulses of capitalism on the one hand, and the repressive practices of the regime on the other. This is a mature fascism, not a frenzied mass movement, and the current regime is not composed of revolutionary fanatics. Today’s Chinese leaders are the heirs of two very different revolutions, Mao’s and Deng’s. The first was a failed communist experiment; the second is a fascist transformation whose future is up for grabs.
在另一方面，伪装成受害人一直都是法西斯主义文化的一部分，像第一次和第二次大战之间的德国和意大利一样，中国感到了背叛和屈辱，也在旨在为自己诸多的的历史伤口寻求报复。这不一定是一个真的焦虑迹象；但它却是所有法西斯运动和政权的核心 --激进民族主义—的不可少的一部分。我们不能去审视中国暴君的心灵，但我怀疑，中国是一个极不稳定的制度，本身体现了资本主义的民主推动力和镇压政权的两种力量的较量。这是一个成熟的法西斯主义，而不是一个疯狂的群众运动，而当政者不是由革命狂热分子组成的。今天中国的领导者是两种不同革命方式的继承者——毛泽东和邓小平。前者是在一个失败的共产主义试验者；后暑是一个法西斯主义转型者，其前途是有待定夺的。

If the fascist model is correct, we should not be at all surprised by the recent rhetoric or mass demonstrations. Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy were every bit as sensitive to any sign of foreign criticism as the Chinese today, both because victimhood is always part of the definition of such states, and because it’s an essential technique of mass control. The violent denunciations of Westerners who criticize Chinese repression may not be a sign of internal anxiety or weakness. They may instead be a sign of strength, a demonstration of the regime’s popularity. Remember that European fascism did not fall as the result of internal crisis—it took a bloody world war to bring it down. Fascism was so alarmingly popular neither Italians not Germans produced more than token resistance until the war began to be lost. It may well be that the mass condemnation of Western calls for greater political tolerance is in fact a sign of political success.
如果我们上面作出的法西斯模型的猜测是正确的，那我们都不应该为最近的宣传和大规模示威而感到惊讶。当年的希特勒的德国和墨索里尼的意大利都像中国现在一样对每一点外国批评的迹象都那么敏感，都是因为把自己塑造成受害者是这样的政权国家的定义成分，因为这是重要的控制民众的手法。中国人强烈地遣责对中国的镇压政策进行评论的西方人，也许这并不能表明其内部的焦虑或软弱。这可能相反显示他们的强壮，实证了这个政体已经深得人心。记住欧洲法西斯主义并不是因为内部危机而垮台――而是血腥的世界大战让它垮台的。法西斯如此惊人地流行，在他们在战争中开始失利之前，他们从没有遇到过他们驾驭不了的抵抗。这样就有充分理由说明针对西方要求更多的政治宽容呼吁的大规模谴责事实上是政治成功的表现。

Since classical fascism had such a brief life span, it is hard to know whether or not a stable, durable fascist state is possible. Economically, the corporate state, of which the current Chinese system is a textbook example, may prove more flexible and adaptable than the rigid central planning that doomed communism in the Soviet Empire and elsewhere (although the travails of Japan, which also tried to combine capitalist enterprise with government guidance, show the kinds of problems China will likely face). Our brief experience with fascism makes it difficult to evaluate the possibilities of political evolution, and the People’s Republic is full of secrets. But prudentstrategists would do well to assume that the regime will be around for a while longer—perhaps a lot longer.
因为我们知道正统的法西斯主义只是昙花一现，所以这很难确定稳定、长久的法西斯政府是不是可能的。从经济上来看，社团主义（目前中国的制度就是一本可以为例的教科书）也许会证明更灵活的，更具适应性的经济制度比死板的中央计划经济更具合理性，因为中央计划经济在曾注定了共产主义在苏联帝国和其它地方的失败（即使曾经试图将资本主义企业与政府的指导相结合来运行经济的日本在此过程中所感到的阵痛会预示中国在这方面可能遇到的困难））。由于我们与法西斯主义只有短暂的交锋，我们很难估量政治进化过程中的种种可能，并且这人民的共和国是充满了秘密。但谨慎的战略家如果做出这个政权或许会长时间存在 –或许很长时间存在 – 这样的结论的话，也许会被证明是正确的。

If it is a popular, fascist regime, should the world prepare for some difficult and dangerous confrontations with the People’s Republic? Twentieth-century fascist states were very aggressive; Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were both expansionist nations. Is it not likely that China will similarly seek to enlarge its domain?
如果中国政府是深受欢迎的，法西斯的政权，那全世界是不是应该为与人民共和国可能发生的困难和危险的对峙做些准备呢？二十世纪的法西斯国家非常具有侵略性；纳粹德国和法西斯意大利均是扩张主义的国家。那中国是否也会同样寻求扩大其疆土？

I believe the answer is “yes, but.”  Many Chinese leaders might like to see their sway extend throughout the region, and beyond. China’s military is not so subtly preparing the capability to defeat U.S. forces in Asia in order to prevent intervention in any conflict on its periphery. No serious student of China doubts the enormous ambitions of both the leadership and the masses. But, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, the Chinese tyrants do not urgently need quick geographical expansion to demonstrate the glory of their country and the truth of their vision. For the moment, at least, success at home and global recognition of Chinese accomplishments seem to be enough. Since Chinese fascism is less ideological than its European predecessors, Chinese leaders are far more flexible than Hitler and Mussolini.
我相信答案是“会的，但是”。许多中国领导人也许想看其势力在整个地区扩张，而且想扩张得更大。中国军队并没有那么预备好打败美军在亚洲的军力，来防止对其周边地区的任何冲突的干预。任何一个有理智的中国研究者都不会怀疑中国从领导人到民众的巨大野心。但是，与希特勒和墨索里尼不同，中国的暴君们并不急着快速进行地域扩张，以此来显示其国家的荣耀，显示远见卓识的正确性。至少就目前而言，国内的成功和被全球承认的中国成就似乎已经足够了。因为较其欧洲前辈，中国的法西斯主义没掺杂那么多空想主义，中国的领导人远远比希特勒与墨索里尼灵活得多。

Nonetheless, the short history of classical fascism suggests that it is only a matter of time before China will pursue confrontation with the West. That is built into the dna of all such regimes. Sooner or later, Chinese leaders will feel compelled to demonstrate the superiority of their system, and even the most impressive per capita GDP will not do. Superiority means others have to bend their knees, and cater to the wishes of the dominant nation. Just as Mussolini saw the colonization of Africa and the invasion of Greece and the Balkans as necessary steps in the establishment of a new fascist empire, so the Chinese are likely to demand tribute from their neighbors—above all, the Chinese on the island nation of Taiwan, in order to add the recovery of lost territory to the regime’s list of accomplishments. Even today, at a time when the regime is seeking praise, not tribute, in the run-up to the Olympic Games, there are bellicose overtones to official rhetoric.
虽然如此，正统法西斯短暂的历史暗示中国与西方进行面对面的较量只是时间问题。因为它早就写进了所有这种制度的DNA里了。中国的领导人迟早会感到不得不展现其制度的优越性，到那时连最让人惊叹的人均国内生产总值都不能证明这一点。优越性就意味着别人都要卑躬屈膝，都要来迎合这优越国家的意愿。正如墨索里尼认为非洲的殖民化和希腊与巴尔干地区的侵略行为都是建立其新法西斯帝国的必要步骤，所以中国可能要求其邻国向其表示臣服——首先，是台湾岛国上的人民必须对中国俯首称臣，这样得而复失的领土便会写到中共的战功簿上。目前，这个政权寻求的是赞美，而不是臣服，但是即使如此，在备战奥运的过程当中，我们从当局的语调里还是能感受到火药味。

How, then, should the democracies deal with China? The first step is to disabuse ourselves of the notion that wealth is the surest guarantor of peace. The West traded with the Soviet Union, and gave them credits as well, but it did not prevent the Kremlin from expanding into the Horn of Africa, or sponsoring terrorist groups in Europe and the Middle East. A wealthy China will not automatically be less inclined to go to war over Taiwan, or, for that matter, to wage or threaten war with Japan.
那么民主国家应该如何与中国打交道呢？第一步，是要使我们自己从“仓廪实而知礼节”这样的信仰中清醒过来。西方与苏联进行贸易，并且也给他们贷款，但这并不能阻止克里姆林宫把势力扩张到非洲的合恩，也没有阻止他赞助在欧洲和中东的恐怖主义集团。富裕的中国不会自动地减轻向台湾宣战的倾向，同样也不会减少发动战争或用战争威胁日本的可能。

Indeed, the opposite may be true—the richer and stronger China becomes, the more they build up their military might, the more likely such wars may be. It follows that the West must prepare for war with China, hoping thereby to deter it. A great Roman once said that if you want peace, prepare for war. This is sound advice with regard to a fascist Chinese state that wants to play a global role.
事实也许会正相反——中国越是富有，越是强大，他就越会增加其军事力量，越有可能发动这样的战争。这意味着西方必须做好与中国开战的准备，希望能从而阻止他。一个伟大的罗马人曾说过，如果你想要和平，那就准备好打仗吧。这个是个面对一个想要发挥全球性作用的法西斯中国的可靠建议。

Meanwhile, we should do what we can to convince the people of China that their long-term interests are best served by greater political freedom, no matter how annoying and chaotic that may sometimes be. I think we can trust the Chinese leaders on this one. Any regime as palpably concerned about the free flow of information, knows well that ideas about freedom might be very popular. Let’s test that hypothesis, by talking directly to “the billion.” In today’s world, we can surely find ways to reach them.
同时，我们应该尽可能地劝服中国人民，更大的政治自由将服务于他们的长远利益，无论这个过程有时会让让人感到多么恼怒和造成多大的麻烦。我想我们应该在这一点上相信中国领导人。任何顾虑信息的自由流通的政权都很清楚地知道自由思想将有可能很受欢迎。通过直接与“亿口人民”交谈，让我们考验一下这个假说吧。在当今世界，我们肯定能找到与他们接触的方法。

If we do not take such steps, our risk will surely increase, and explosions of rage, manipulated or spontaneous, will recur. Eventually they will take the form of real actions.
如果我们不采取这些步子，我们的风险肯定会增加，被人操纵或自发的愤怒将会重演。最终他们会采取真正的行动。

Mr. Ledeen is an expert on U.S. foreign policy at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. He served as a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Ledeen是美国外交政策专家——一个为公共政策研究的美国企业研究所。他是在中羡经济与安全审议委员会的委员

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【备注】翻译顺序按评论发表时间从先往后排列，第一批先发六条。原文无分段，译文做了适当分段以方便阅读。

August @ 2008-05-04 01:13:47
I am curious why when it comes to the U.S., you call it patriotism whereas when it comes to China, you call it nationalism and even fascism? Of course, the Chinese want political freedom but doesn't that freedom we all agree on include the freedom from the interference from foreign powers? Why, did you rename French fries to freedom fries when the French try to "interfere" your invasion of Iraq? Tell me what did you mean by freedom fries? The freedom to invade other countries according to your wishful thinking of "liberating" them without asking them if they really want your "liberation"? Mr Ledeen definitely has no tolerance for people of other countries to have the freedom from American arrogant imposition and denial of their voices. Well, if all the people around the world have their political representation in Washington D.C., they might not mind losing such a freedom. Then, let America blow up! Otherwise, please do not denigrate people in other countries who have different views from yours as fascists. Nobody in this world lacks moral self-righteousness.

    我很好奇为什么这事儿在美国你就叫它爱国主义精神，反之到了中国你就叫它民族主义甚至法西斯？当然，中国人想要政治自由，但是难道我们不是全都认可了这种自由——比方说，由外国强权干涉而来的自由？为什么你不在法国试图“干涉”你入侵伊拉克的时候，把法国薯条改名叫自由薯条？告诉我，你对自由薯条怎么看？凭着“解放他们”的幻想就去侵略别国，根本不问问他们是不是真的想要你的“解放”——就是这种自由吗？
    很明显，Ledeen先生容忍不了别国人在是否接受美国傲慢自大的强迫要求这事上拥有自由，并且否定他们的声音。要是世界上所有人民都在华盛顿有自己的政治代表，他们大概不会介意失去这种“自由”。然后，让美国闹翻天吧（blow up）！另一方面，请不要把和你观点不同的别国人民诽谤为法西斯。这世界上谁也不缺道德的自我标榜。

@ 2008-05-04 06:11:50
To the person who made the 1st comment: Yes you have a good point. But with a country that is ranked one of the lowest in media freedom I find something dangerous. American's are complacent...true...but we have political fights back and forth. It's not like either the anti-war or pro-war movements have been politically silenced. The U.S. allows both sides to express their points of view. As far as I know...there are no protests for pro-Tibetans in the mainland (maybe only Tibet). Where do Chinese people express their grievances? China also "liberated" Tibet. The U.S. "liberated" Iraq. Are powerful states really so different? Yes...American's were on both sides. Some wanted war some didnt. I don't know any movement in China strong enough to say that Tibet should not be a part of China. The PRC "liberated" Tibet with no political opposition. I do agree that maybe the author took it a little bit too far...I don't think that Hu Jintao is a Hitler or a Mussolini. However, you can't ignore the fact that the Chinese have been bringing out the rhetoric that all these disputed lands have always been a part of China. Xinjiang, Tibet, Taiwan, Spratley Islands....Why are the Chinese so quick to say "Is and always will be part of China." Wheres the dissent? There should be people out there who can express their grievances with the government. Modern western governments allows political dissent. China does not. When a country of 1.3 billion has no political dissent...something is wrong.

    致发出第一条评论的人：是的，你的观点很好。但是对一个被列为媒体自由度最低的国家之一的国家，我发觉有些事情是危险的。
    美国人是自负，没错，但是我们有相互间的政治斗争。不像（某些国家）反战和拥战运动都被政治性压制。美国允许每一方都发表他们自己的看法。据我所知，在大陆可没有拥护藏人的抗议（也许只在西藏有）。中国人到哪里去陈述自己的冤屈？中国也“解放”了西藏。美国“解放”了伊拉克。强权国家们有什么区别吗？
    是的，美国人各有不同观点，有些想要战争，有些不想。我没发现中国有哪个运动团体强大到说西藏不应该是中国的一部分。共和国“解放”了西藏——没有政治反对派。
    我确实赞成（这种观点，即）这个作者有点扯远了……我不认为胡JT（外国人说别国口无遮拦，但我不愿用自己的笔写这些——译者注）是希特勒或墨索里尼。无论如何，你不能忽视一个事实，就是，中国人推出了一套空头雄辩说所有那些有争议的土地一直都是中国的一部分。新疆、西藏、台湾、南沙群岛……为什么这些中国人这么急急忙忙地说“是而且将一直是中国的一部分”？不同意见在哪？（历史写的非常明确，要什么不同意见，哪国人愿意将自己国家的一部分分裂出去？）应该只有离开那里的人们才能表达自己的不平吧。现代西方政府允许政治异见，但中国不允许。一个有十三亿人口的国家没有政治异见……这可有问题了。

Josie Nguyen @ 2008-05-06 02:28:47
I'm not a fan of the current Chinese regime in China but I have to say I find Mr. Ledeen's characterization of China as a fascist state intellectually dishonest, war provoking and underneath it all is a manifestation of a deep sense of moral self-righteousness. If this piece of writing represents the view of a state, it can safely be characterized as a declaration of war on China and Mr. Ledeen will deserve to be recorded in the history book as the devil who started it all. If I were Chinese, it certainly would make my blood boil. Westerners just don't understand Asians and frankly Chinese are not unique in their reaction to Western media in regards to the Tibet issue. Try to find an issue and invite those well-paid Western journalists do the same thing to Vietnam, Japan, South/North Korea, India, Burma etc...or Russia for that matter and they soon will find out what nationalism means on the streets and among ordinary people.

    我不是当前中国政体的粉丝，但是我不得不说，我认为Ledeen先生把中国描述成一个法西斯国家，这是理智的欺骗，是在煽动战争。隐藏其下的是一种深深的道德自我标榜意识。如果这篇文章反映的是国家观点，这保证会被视为是对中国的宣战，而Ledeen先生将活该以始作俑的恶魔身份被载入史册。如果我是中国人，这肯定会把我气得热血沸腾。
    西方人就是不明白，在西方媒体对西藏事务的关注这事上，亚洲人和坦率的中国人的反应不是独一份儿。试着找一个问题，然后请那些赚得腰包鼓鼓的西方记者到越南、日本、南北朝鲜、印度、缅甸或者俄罗斯做些同样的事，他们马上就会明白街面儿上和普通民众中间的民族主义是什么意思。

August @ 2008-05-06 10:00:34
True, most Chinese have zero tolerance for territorial secession, but most Americans do the same. The American Civil War was fought primarily not for emancipation but for preserving the union, and was remembered in that way even well into the middle of the twentieth century. The Emancipation theme was a later projection largely as a result of civil rights movement (please read Barry Schwartz's Lincoln book). So it's inappropriate to liken the Tibet issue with American occupation of Iraq. Can you imagine how horrible it would be for an ordinary Chinese to envision his country being broken apart and a lot of his fellow citizens, either Tibetans, or Muslins, or Hans, driven away from their home (these people have lived together with each other for centuries--do not tell me that Tibetan exiles will be lenient angels when they come to power because Buddhism is intrinsically peaceful)? The Chinese, just like any people living in a rapidly changing society and already having experienced a lot of social dislocation and dizziness, are extremely hungry for social stability. That's why they are so horrified by the riots. So yes, most Chinese are quite unanimous in terms of the sovereignty issue. But apart from that, there are a lot of public debates and discussions going on in China in terms of Tibet policies as well as other policies. However constrained Chinese media freedom is, remember the civil society there is every growing and vibrant. Such public debates and discussions you can read in many national newspapers and journals. People in the U.S. and the West simply do not know about all these things because Western journalists and academics are too lazy and arrogant to read them. They only want to see what they wish to see. Western journalists only read People's Daily and say, "this is too bad. let's go listen to the authentic Chinese voice." So they go to interview the Chinese "dissidents" who have already approached them and made friends with them, yet who are extremely marginalized and unpopular in China. These lazy journalists never listen to the middle stratum and never bother reading Chinese newspapers, etc. American scholars do not talk to Chinese intellectuals except those who would like to talk to them. That's why they always end up knowing nothing new and real. To be honest, the way that Americans learn to know things in China today bears striking similarity with the way the Chinese learned to know things in the U.S. four decades ago, when they just approached their communist friends in America and asked："tell me what's going on in your country"! It is a strategic failure for the Americans just it was for the Chinese.

    确实，大多数中国人丝毫不能容忍领土分裂，但大多数美国人也是。
    美国内战首要地不是为了奴隶解放而是为了保卫联邦。甚至直到二十世纪中期都如此被人铭记。奴隶解放问题很大程度上是民权运动成果在后来的具体化（请参阅Barry Schwartz的《林肯》一书）。所以把西藏问题比作美国对伊拉克的占领是不恰当的。自己的国家被分裂，许多同乡们，无论藏人、穆斯林还是汉人，被赶出家园——你能想象这对一个普通中国人来说有多可怕吗？（这些人们已经在一起生活了多少个世纪了，别跟我说流亡藏人上了台就是仁爱天使，就因为佛教本质上是和平的。）
    这些中国人，就像任何生活在急速变化的社会、已经体验过许多社会断层和茫然的人们一样，极其渴望社会安定。这就是为什么他们对暴乱如此惊恐的原因。所以，是的，大多数中国人在主权问题上意见完全一致。但除此之外，中国国内在西藏政策和其他政策问题上，正进行着很多公开探讨和辩论。虽然中国媒体自由是受限的，但记住，这里的公民社会正在极大地成长和活跃中。这类探讨和辩论你可以在很多国有报纸和期刊上读到。
    美国和西方的人们完全不知道这些事情，是因为西方记者和学究们太懒太傲慢，根本不读这些。他们只想看到他们希望看到的。西方记者只看人民日报，然后就说：“这太烂了，让我们听听可信的中国声音。”于是他们就跑去采访那些早就跟他们称兄道弟的中国“不同政见者”，那些在中国早已被极端边缘化的不受欢迎的人。
    这些懒惰的记者们从不倾听中间阶层，从不耐烦读一读中国新闻报纸，等等。美国学者不和中国知识分子对话，除非人家乐意和他们谈。这就是为什么他们对新事物和真相总是一无所知。老实说，美国今天学习认识中国事物的方式，和四十年前中国学习认识美国事物的方式有着惊人的相似性——他们靠近他们在美国的共产党朋友问：“告诉我，你们的国家现在怎么着啦？”这对美国是一个战略性失败，就像当年对中国一样。

hengyi.zhuang @ 2008-05-07 10:55:11
i want to show all of you this: feer's manager says:" my dear wokers, let's write sth bad about China" pupil A say:"but China is good" feer's manager answers:"come on~where is your creation?? and you know what? if we write such things, more people will come to read, that is money!!"
我想给大伙儿看看这个：远东经济评论的经理说：“我亲爱的员工们，让我们写些中国的坏话吧。”学生A说：“但是中国挺好啊。” 远东经济评论的经理回答：“我说，你的创造力哪儿去了？你知道吗？如果我们这么写，会有更多人来看，这是钱哪！”

Augo Knoke @ 2008-05-07 18:04:47
The need to stuff new phenomena into already known little conceptual boxes and thus reduce our fear of ambiguity seems to be at the bottom of Mr. Ledeen’s argument. Of course there are similarities in all authoritarian regimes, because, well, they are authoritarian. But that would qualify the Soviet Union as a fascist state, too – a large majority of the Russian citizenry was (and, alas, still is xenophobic), their somewhat insecure feeling about international status led to chairman Khrushtshev’s attempt at atomic blackmail against the US during the Cuban missile crisis, and so on. But Ledeen is trying to differentiate China from the USSR, and indeed the organisation of the economy is very different in China. But there are important differences between China today and Nazi Germany, too. I suspect that is also true for fascist Italy. The background to Nazism in Germany was the lost war (WWI) and the economic downturn in the depression. There can be little doubt that the backbone of the aggressive stance of the Nazi movement was the very real or feared dispossession of the lower middle classes – of which Hitler himself was the prime example. Relative prosperity was evaporating fast and cruelly. Hitler’s economy was expanding because of massive investments in an infrastructure geared towards and only sustainable in the expansionist war that finally came about. Now compare this to China, today. The economy is expanding because of the production of eminently sellable goods (ask American Unions about it). There are dangers when growth slows down, as it seems to start to do, and there is a lot of social upheaval going on in China, right now, already. There are quite a few people left behind in the countryside, and the temptation for the rulers might very well be to seek escape valves in an aggressive external policy. But then, all the winners, the expanding middle classes of today as well as the princelings would lose a lot in an aggressive external policy. At the core of the Deng policy was and is to attain wealth for as many people as quickly as possible in whatever way, the core of Nazism was to restore, if there ever was, national greatness. If Chinese development should stall, temptation might grow for a “fascist” solution. But it is very unwise to confound what might be with what is because you rob yourself of viable political alternatives in dealing with powerful authoritarian rulers.

   把新概念硬塞进已知的小小概念空间里的需要，和减少我们对不确定性的恐惧的需要，看来是引起Ledeen先生论点的根本原因。当然，所有的独裁主义政体都有相似性，因为……好吧，因为他们是独裁主义。但也可以用此证明苏联是个法西斯国家，因为大多数俄罗斯公民以前（唉，现在也是）恐外的，美国在古巴导弹危机期间遭到赫鲁晓夫核勒索时他们对国家的国际地位感觉有点不可靠，等等。
    但是Ledeen试图把中国和苏联区别开来，而且确实中国的经济体制是不同的。但今天的中国和纳粹德国之间却还是有不少重要区别的。我认为它和法西斯意大利相比也是。
    纳粹在德国产生的背景是一战的失利和萧条时期的经济低迷。难以否认纳粹运动的侵略性姿态的确是真实的，或者中下阶层对破产的恐惧——希特勒本人就是第一批的例子。相对的繁荣迅速而残酷地消失。希特勒的经济系统得以扩张是因为对基础设施的大量投资指向而且只够负担最终到来的扩张战争。
    现在和今天的中国比一比，中国的经济膨胀是因为制造特别好卖的商品（问问American Unions吧）。增长减缓时会有危险，好像现在已经开始了，而且现在在中国已经开始了很多的社会剧变。很少有人被留在乡下，而通过统治者的诱导很容易在激进的对外政策中找到宣泄口。但另一方面，这些胜者，这些正在扩大的如小贵族般的中产阶级，也会在激进的对外政策中损失很多。
    邓小平政策的核心以前是，现在也是，用一切方法尽可能让更多人尽快富起来。而纳粹主义的核心却是重建——如果他们曾经有过的话——民族辉煌。如果中国的发展停滞了，“法西斯”革命的诱惑也许会增长。但是，把可能发生的和已经发生的相混淆是非常愚蠢的，因为你是在用一个对付强大独裁主义统治者的可行政治选择来打劫自己。

学习了。那些评论看起来更加理智一些。